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A Primer on Monetary Policy
Part II: Targets and Indicators
The last issue of the Weekly Letter (Walsh 1994)
discussed the goals of monetary policy and the
main instruments actually controlled by the Fed-
eral Reserve. It noted that most economists be-
lieve monetary policy can have important effects
on output and employment only in the short-run;
in the longer run, the Fed can affect inflation but
not employment. This Letter focuses on issues
related to the actual implementation of monetary
policy.
Channels of monetary policy
Economists disagree about the exact linkages
among monetary policy actions, inflation, and
economic activity. Most agree that banks playa
critical role in the transmission process, although
evidence is inconclusive about whether it is
through the liability side of banks' balance sheets
(deposits and other components of the money
supply) or through the asset side (bank loans).
In either case, the general view is that monetary
policy works by affecting interest rates. Increases
in interest rates raise the cost of borrowing and
lead to reductions in business investment spend-
ing and household purchases of durable goods
such as autos and new homes. These declines in
spending reduce the aggregate demand for the
economy's output, leading firms to cut back on
production and employment. Conversely, interest
rate declines stimulate aggregate spending and
lead to increases in production and employment.
Since the Fed can control the federal funds rate,
it would appear to be a simple matter to link pol-
icy actions-changes in the funds rate-to real
economic activity. Unfortunately, four critical
problems arise in implementing monetary policy.
First, while the Fed can affect market interest
rates, spending decisions and economic activity
depend on real interest rates, that is, market rates
corrected for expected rates of inflation. Second,
economic activity is likely to be related to both
short-term and long-term real interest rates, while
the Fed most directly controls very short-term
market rates. Third, the Fed is interested ulti-
mately in measures of economic performance
like inflation, real economic growth and employ-
ment, yet data on these variables that mightbe
used to guide policy are not available every day
or every week or even every month. And fourth,
policy actions taken today will affect the econ-
omy only with a significant lag so that policy
changes must be made in anticipation of future
developments in the economy. Becau~e the first
two of these issues have been recently discussed
by Trehan (1993) and Cogley (1993), they are
touched upon only briefly here.
Real interest rates
Aggregate spending is related not to market inter-
est rates but to the expected real rate of interest.
Since it is difficult to measure expected inflation,
it is hard to know the current leve! of rea! interest
rates. And variations in expected inflation can
make a big difference. In 1978, the funds rate
averaged 7.93 percent, but the rate of inflation
was 9.1 percent; ifthe inflation was fully antici-
pated, that 7.93 funds rate was equivalent to an
expected real rate of negative 1.17 percent. Today
the funds rate is 4.25. If the market expects a
continuation of the current 3 percent inflation
rate, then today's funds rate translates into a pos-
itive 1.25 percent expected real rate. So a funds
rate of 4.25 percent today may be more restric-
tive than the 7.93 funds rate was in 1978. With
inflation expectations difficult to measure, econo-
mists can disagree about the current level of real
rates and therefore the stance of monetary policy.
In addition, the Fed can only influence the level
of real interest rates in the short-run; it cannot
permanently prevent the real rate from returning
to its equilibrium level without risking accelerat-
ing inflation or deflation. Persistent attempts to
keep real rates too low will initially generate an
economic expansion that will lead to more rapid
inflation. As individuals come to expect higher
inflation, real rates will tend to adjust back to
their equilibrium level. Further expansionary
policy would be needed to keep the real rate
down, leading to further increases in inflation.
Most estimates of expected inflation imply that
real short-term interest rates earlier this year
were very low, too low to be consistent with
steady real growth at a sustainable rate. However,FRBSF
the real rate of interest consistent with sustained
growth varies over time in ways that are difficult
to measure or predict. Thus, the benchmark
against which any estimate ofthe current real
rate should be compared is itself not directly
measured. So economists can disagree about
whether current real rates are too high or too low.
Long-term interest rates
Aggregate spending is related both to long-term
real interest rates and to the short-term rates the
Fed can affect directly. Long-term rates will be
equal to the average ofthe expected future short-
term rates plus a risk factor that reflects the pre-
mium necessary to induce risk-averse investors
to hold long-term bonds. An increase in short-
term rates that is viewed to be temporary will.
have a much smaller impact on long rates than
would an increase expected to be relatively
persistent.
Long-term interest rates can be expressed as the
sum of an expected real return and an adjust-
ment for expected inflation. Long rates have the
potential, therefore, to provide information about
the market's expectations about inflation. Long
rates will tend to rise (fall) if higher (lower) in-
flation is expected. After the Fed's most recent
increase in the funds rate on May 17th, long-
term interest rates actually declined. This was
interpreted as evidence that financial market par-
ticipants were confident the Fed had tightened
sufficiently to ensure inflation would not in-
crease. Unfortunately, long-term interest rates
also vary because of variations in the expected
rate of return. Because ofthe difficulties in pre-
dicting these variations, it is not always possible
to interpret changes in long-term interest rates as
providing information aboutinflation expectations.
Intermediate targets
Ideally, the Fed would like to be able to monitor
continuously its ultimate goals, like the rate
of inflation, in order to adjust its policy instru-
ments. Unfortunately, new data on inflation are
available only monthly, whiledata on GOP growth
are available onlyquarterly. Consequently, the Fed
must rely on data available more frequently, such
as interest rates, which it can observe continu-
ously, or monetary aggregates, which are avail-
able weekly, as intermediate targets tohelp guide
policy. An intermediate target is a variable that,
while not directly under the control ofthe Fed
(that is, it is not an instrument like the federal
funds rate), responds fairly quickly to policy ac-
tions, is observable frequently, and bears a pre-
dictable relationship to the ultimate goals of
policy.
To use an intermediate target, the Fed must first
determine the value for the intermediate target
consistent with the desired goals. The Fed then
adjusts its instruments in order to ensure the in-
termediate target variable takes on the chosen
value. That is, policy is conducted as if the inter-
mediate target value were the goal of policy. If
new information suggests the intermediate target
variable is diverging from the targeted value, pol-
icy instruments are adjusted to return it to target.
During the early 1980s, several different meas-
ures of the money supply served as intermediate
targets; for example, when M2 was growing
above its target range, this signaled a need to
tighten policy by contracting the growth of bank
reserves. Slow M2 growth was a signal to expand
reserve growth. However, the relationship be-
tween the monetary aggregates and the ultimate
goals of monetary policy became increasingly
unpredictable, reducing the value of the aggre-
gates as intermediate targets (see Judd-Trehan
1992).
Poiicy indicators
Currently, the Fed has no single reliable interme-
diate target that could be used to guide policy;
consequently, the Fed must rely on many varia-
bles forinformation to guide policy. These variables
are indicators ofthe current state ofthe economy
or offuture developments in the economy.
Indicators of future developments are needed be-
cause it takes time for a monetary policy action
to affect the economy. Policy actions taken in
early 1994 are likely to have their greatest effect
on the economy in late 1994 and early 1995. This
makes it imperative that policy actions be taken
not on the basis of current economic conditions,
but on the basis of forecasts offuture economic
conditions. To waitto shift the Fed's policy stance
until inflation actually increases, for example,
would mean that inflationary momentum will have
already developed, making the task of redUcing
inflation that much harder and more costly in terms
ofjob losses. In the past, the Fed has been criticized
for waiting too long before adjusting its policies.
Basing policy on forecasts creates its own dif-
ficulties. Because economic developments are
difficult to predict, forecasts often turn out to be
wrong. And because forecasters often disagree,
there will be corresponding differences over the
appropriate stance of policy. The current situation
is a case in point. The Fed has tightened policy,
not in response to any current rise in inflation,
but on the basis of its forecast of rising inflation
in the future if it maintained its previous policystance. Critics have claimed that future inflation
increases are unlikely. Because the debate is over
forecasts of what inflation would have done un-
der the Fed's previous policy, they are difficult to
resolve.
In the absence of an agreed upon intermediate
target to guide policy, the Fed must evaluate a
number of variables that may serve to indicate
future economic developments in order to deter-
mine if policy changes are appropriate. Among
the indicators that have been proposed are nomi-
nal income growth, real interestrates, commod-
ity prices, exchange rates and the price of gold.
For example, the Fed could use nominal income
growth as an indicator by comparing the most
recent data on nominal growth to the growth rate
consistent with sustained real growth and low
inflation. Since most estimates of the economy's
long-run sustainable growth rate of real income
are in the 2 to 2V2 percent range, if the inflation
target were 1 percent, nominal income growth
should be in the 3 to 3% percent range.
Because no single indicator variable consistently
provides accurate information on the future ofthe
economy orthe stance ofmonetary policy, the Fed
must rely on a number of indicators; it "looks at
everything:' in principle, this is just what the Fed
should do. Exchange rates, nominal income
growth, real interest rates, money supply growth,
commodity prices, and so on all provide some
information that is useful for conducting policy.
Unfortunately, each indicator also can provide
misleading signals about the economy, and often
the signals they give are contradictory. During
the last two years, for example, while real interest
rates were low indicating expansionary monetary
policy, the M2 definition of the money supply
was growing very slowly, indicating a more con-
tractionary stance of policy.
As an alternative to using forecasts or relying on
a number of indicator variables, many econo-
mists have proposed simple rules to guide Fed
behavior. The most famous was Milton Friedman's
rule of maintaining a constant growth rate ofthe
money supply. More recently, rules for the mon-
etary base (currency plus bank reserves), M2,
nominal GOp' and the funds rate have been
studied (for example, see Judd and Motley 1991).
In general, these alternatives are "feedback
rules": The Fed's policy instrument is adjusted
on the basis of recent movements in measures
of economic activity such as nominalincome
growth, the unemployment rate, or actual infla-
tion. Such rules can help to reduce the uncer-
tainty associated with monetary policy actions by
making policy more predictable.
Conclusions
The conduct of monetary policy often consists of
balancing inconsistent goals using sometimes
unreliable indicators to manipulate tools whose
effects on the economy are uncertain. Despite
these uncertainties, the general conduct of mon-
etary policy in recent years has received surpris-
ingly wide approval. The current controversy
over interest rate increases is not about the fun-
damental need to prevent a resurgence of infla-
tion, but instead has centered on the difficulty of
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